ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to reflect on João Anzanello Carrascoza’s writing process, based on the concept of creation as network and expanded with Bakthin’s discussions on polyphony. The writer’s files are studied from the perspective of communicative practices, with emphasis on the dialogism of subjects in community, who engage in dialogues of different natures. We present questions that move the author’s literary project, the materialities of the construction of his work and the dilution of boundaries between process (...) and work. (shrink)

Não resta dúvida de que os princípios da Ilustração, como os da liberdade, igualdade e fraternidade estiveram muito presentes na história de várias nações ibero-americanas. No caso brasileiro, no entanto, é evidente o quanto o Estado guiado por esses nobres ideais tem engendrado frequentemente o seu oposto. A falta de certos serviços e garantias essenciais para cidadãos no estado brasileiro é algo incontestável. Conhecendo a importância de tais princípios no Brasil, a proposta é compreender como Sérgio Buarque de Holanda utiliza (...) certos conceitos emblemáticos da filosofia das Luzes e qual papel desempenharam, em sua percepção, na formação política brasileira. (shrink)

Este trabalho tem por propósito fazer uma análise sobre o valor formador da filosofia, apresentando o quanto esta disciplina pode contribuir para a formação integral dos estudantes, e ainda como o PIBID – o Programa Institucional de Bolsa de Iniciação à Docência, se insere nesse projeto formativo, não apenas preparando futuros docentes, mas contribuindo também para a formação de futuros pesquisadores que integrarão os Programas de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia. A pesquisa foi elaborada com dados de dois anos de subprojetos da (...) área da Filosofia, e os resultados apontam que o Programa bem conduzido suscita uma abordagem filosófica, talvez a mais essencial de todas, a do nexo entre a teoria e a prática. (shrink)

A obra de Pierre Bayle colaborou decisivamente para a formação do discurso filosófico sobre o conceito de tolerância, noção central nas sociedades modernas. Os escritos de Bayle foram essenciais para a disseminação daquela idéia pelos philosophes no século XVIII. Uma das principais teses defendidas por Bayle é que a liberdade de consciência e de opinião deve ser garantida aos indivíduos. O Estado não deve perseguir por motivos religiosos e não deve haver violência quando se trate de opiniões que não geram (...) perigo para a ordem pública. A liberdade de consciência tem por conseqüência uma tolerância irrestrita que deve se estender a todas as confissões religiosas e até mesmo aos ateus. O propósito deste texto é analisar alguns argumentos de Bayle na defesa da tolerância, sobretudo no Commentaire Philosophique, com a intenção de evidenciar a novidade do tratamento do autor, que por meio de metáforas e inversões, estabelece a tolerância como algo importante e benéfico para a sociedade política. (shrink)

Resenha sobre o livro Occupy : Movimentos de protesto que tomaram as rua.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the similarities and differences between Bayle and Rousseau especially regarding the question of the necessity of religion and political consequences for society.

K. Lüscher, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 17 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2017, 428pp. TS - BibTeX M4 - Citavi.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

K. Lüscher, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 17 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2017, 428pp. TS - BibTeX M4 - Citavi.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

K. Lüscher, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 17 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2017, 428pp. TS - BibTeX M4 - Citavi.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

K. Lüscher, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 17 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2017, 428pp. TS - BibTeX M4 - Citavi.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

K. Lüscher, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 17 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2017, 428pp. TS - BibTeX M4 - Citavi.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

K. Lüscher, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 17 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2017, 428pp. TS - BibTeX M4 - Citavi.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

K. Lüscher, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 17 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2017, 428pp. TS - BibTeX M4 - Citavi.

It is agreed by most scholars that the Stoics were compatibilists regarding the relation between responsibility and determinism. On this view, the Stoics depart from two other positions. Unlike some eliminative determinists — labelled in modern discussions “hard-determinists”, but already active in Antiquity — they assert that, despite determinism, there are things that “depend on us”, or are : things for which we are genuinely responsible and for which, therefore, we may justifiably be praised or blamed. But the Stoics also (...) depart from the libertarian or “anti-determinist” 2 a position championed by the Epicureans in the early Hellenistic period and by Alexander of Aphrodisias on behalf of the Peripatetics, towards the end of the second century AD. Unlike the libertarian, who agrees on the incompatibility alleged by the hard-determinist, but preserves responsibility by rejectin necessitation, the Stoics preserve both responsibility and necessitation. (shrink)

AI research is growing rapidly raising various ethical issues related to safety, risks, and other effects widely discussed in the literature. We believe that in order to adequately address those issues and engage in a productive normative discussion it is necessary to examine key concepts and categories. One such category is anthropomorphism. It is a well-known fact that AI’s functionalities and innovations are often anthropomorphized (i.e., described and conceived as characterized by human traits). The general public’s anthropomorphic attitudes and some (...) of their ethical consequences (particularly in the context of social robots and their interaction with humans) have been widely discussed in the literature. However, how anthropomorphism permeates AI research itself (i.e., in the very language of computer scientists, designers, and programmers), and what the epistemological and ethical consequences of this might be have received less attention. In this paper we explore this issue. We first set the methodological/theoretical stage, making a distinction between a normative and a conceptual approach to the issues. Next, after a brief analysis of anthropomorphism and its manifestations in the public, we explore its presence within AI research with a particular focus on brain-inspired AI. Finally, on the basis of our analysis, we identify some potential epistemological and ethical consequences of the use of anthropomorphic language and discourse within the AI research community, thus reinforcing the need of complementing the practical with a conceptual analysis. (shrink)

Meu objetivo é refletir sobre a lógica do perdão como manifestação da justiça a partir da contribuição filosófica de Paul Ricoeur. Pretendo igualmente refletir sobre o papel da tradição cristã nas leis e na política a partir da perspectiva da justiça. Para tanto, esse debate será articulado em torno de três pressupostos fundamentais: primeiro, a lógica do perdão está para além do esquecimento e da vingança; segundo, o perdão se insere na perspectiva do dom e da gratuidade; enfim, a ideia (...) de reabilitação do ser humano capaz de ser bom e justo que está presente nas lógicas do perdão e da justiça judiciária. Em minha opinião, esta é uma maneira de dar sentido ao discurso religioso em nossa cultura secular. (shrink)

Within the last decades, brain science has been offering new insights into the relationship among diverse psychological processes and the neural correlates of our moral thought and behavior. Despite the distinction between the explanatory/descriptive nature of science and the normative nature of morality, some neuroethicists have claimed that neuroscientific findings have normative implications. In this paper, I identify three interpretations of the claim. The first focuses on neuroscience’s role in explaining the origin of morality and of moral values and how (...) neurobiology is the bases of moral behavior. A second version is about the role that neuroscientific knowledge can play in showing the psychological plausibility of the moral psychology underlying some ethical approaches. Finally, a third version advances that neuroscience could play a role in determining the moral plausibility of some normative approaches. My aim is to delineate each version and highlight the issues raised to suggest that while neuroscience might provide information regarding the nature of moral reasoning, its role in the normative discussion itself is still quite limited. (shrink)

The standard position on moral perfection and gratuitous evil makes the prevention of gratuitous evil a necessary condition on moral perfection. I argue that, on any analysis of gratuitous evil we choose, the standard position on moral perfection and gratuitous evil is false. It is metaphysically impossible to prevent every gratuitously evil state of affairs in every possible world. No matter what God does—no matter how many gratuitously evil states of affairs God prevents—it is necessarily true that God coexists with (...) gratuitous evil in some world or other. Since gratuitous evil cannot be eliminated from metaphysical space, the existence of gratuitous evil presents no objection to essentially omnipotent, essentially omniscient, essentially morally perfect, and necessarily existing beings. (shrink)

For some of us, the defeasibility theory of knowledge remains the most plausible approach to the Gettier Problem. Epistemological fashion and faded memories notwithstanding, persuasive objections to the theory are very hard to find. The most impressive of those objections to the theory that have hitherto gone unanswered are examined and rejected here. These are objections put forward by Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, and John Turri. While these are all interesting, the objection recently put forward by Turri is, we think, (...) by far, the most serious threat to the theory that we have seen in a long time. A successful reply to it requires a surprising amount of care, as it turns out. If tenable, Turri's objection deals a devastating blow to the theory developed by Roderick Chisholm, Keith Lehrer, Peter Klein, Marshall Swain, Risto Hilpinen, John Pollock, and Paul Moser, among others. Under scrutiny, however, the threat proves illusory. It results from inattention to a crucial, but relatively subtle, aspect of.. (shrink)

This book proposes a new solution to the problem of vagueness. There are several different ways of addressing this problem and no clear agreement on which one is correct. The author proposes that it should be understood as the problem of explaining vague predicates in a way that systematizes six intuitions about the phenomenon and satisfies three criteria of adequacy for an ideal theory of vagueness. The third criterion, which is called the “criterion of precisification”, is the most controversial one. (...) It is based on the intuition that a predicate is vague only if it is imprecise. The author considers some different definitions of linguistic imprecision, proposing that a predicate is imprecise if and only if there is no sharp boundary between objects to which its application yields some particular truth-value and objects to which its application does not yield that truth-value. The volume critically reviews the current theories of vagueness and proposes a new one, the Theory of Vagueness as Arbitrariness, which defines a vague predicate as an arbitrary predicate that must be precisified in order to contribute to a sentence that has truth-conditions. The main advantages of this theory over the current alternatives are that it satisfies all three criteria and systematizes the relevant intuitions. (shrink)

Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) is an important ethical, legal, and political theme for the European Commission. Although variously defined, it is generally understood as an interactive process that engages social actors, researchers, and innovators who must be mutually responsive and work towards the ethical permissibility of the relevant research and its products. The framework of RRI calls for contextually addressing not just research and innovation impact but also the background research process, specially the societal visions underlying it and the (...) norms and priorities that shape scientific agendas. This requires the integration of anticipatory, inclusive, and responsive dimensions, and the nurturing of a certain type of reflexivity among a variety of stakeholders, from scientists to funders. In this paper, we do not address potential limitations but focus on the potential contribution of philosophical reflection to RRI in the context of the Ethics and Society subproject of the Human Brain Project (HBP). We show how the type of conceptual analysis provided by philosophically oriented approaches theoretically and ethically broadens research and innovation within the HBP. We further suggest that overt inclusion of philosophical reflection can promote the aims and objectives of RRI. (shrink)

Ruy Perez Tamayo, Rubén Lisker, and Ricardo Tapia, La Construcción de la Bioética, Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2007, reviewed by Arleen L. F. Salles.

In this paper, I explore the Presocratic antecedents of the Stoic theory of conflagration and argue that, even though three central theses of this theory have solid antecedents in Presocratic physics, the logical connection between them is a Stoic innovation. I label the Presocratics who hold these theses ‘Anaximandreans’ and include in this group Anaximander himself, Heraclitus and Diogenes of Apollonia, and reveal that Anaximenes, Democritus and Antiphon share with them central meteorological and cosmological assumptions.

Those of us who have followed Fred Dretske’s lead with regard to epistemic closure and its impact on skepticism have been half-wrong for the last four decades. But those who have opposed our Dretskean stance, contextualists in particular, have been just wrong. We have been half-right. Dretske rightly claimed that epistemic status is not closed under logical implication. Unlike the Dretskean cases, the new counterexamples to closure offered here render every form of contextualist pro-closure maneuvering useless. But there is a (...) way of going wrong under Dretske’s lead. As the paper argues, Cartesian skepticism thrives on closure failure in a way that is yet to be acknowledged in the literature. The skeptic can make do with principles which are weaker than the familiar closure principles. But I will further claim that this is only a momentary reprieve for the skeptic. As it turns out, one of the weaker principles on which a skeptical modus tollens must rest can be shown false. (shrink)

The ἐκπύρωσις, or world's conflagration, followed by the restoration of an identical world seems to go against the rationality of the Stoic god. The aim of this paper is to show that Cleanthes, the second head of the School, can avoid this paradox. According to Cleanthes, the conflagration is an inevitable side-effect of the necessary means used by god to sustain the world. Given that this side-effect is contrary to god's sustaining activity, but unavoidable, god's rationality requires the restoration of (...) an identical world once the conflagration subsides. The paper also deals with the relation between Cleanthes and other early Stoics on the topic of conflagration. In particular, Cleanthes' position seems to differ from Chrysippus'. For in contrast with the Cleanthean god, who causes the conflagration as a side-effect only, the Chrysippean god, according to an influential interpretation put forward by Jaap Mansfeld, causes the conflagration as his ultimate cosmological goal. (shrink)

Those of us who have followed Fred Dretske's lead with regard to epistemic closure and its impact on skepticism have been half-wrong for the last four decades. But those who have opposed our Dretskean stance, contextualists in particular, have been just wrong. We have been half-right. Dretske rightly claimed that epistemic status is not closed under logical implication. Unlike the Dretskean cases, the new counterexamples to closure offered here render every form of contextualist pro-closure maneuvering useless. But there is a (...) way of going wrong under Dretske's lead. As the paper argues, Cartesian skepticism thrives on closure failure in a way that is yet to be acknowledged in the literature. The skeptic can make do with principles which are weaker than the familiar closure principles. But I will further claim that this is only a momentary reprieve for the skeptic. As it turns out, one of the weaker principles on which a skeptical modus tollens must rest can be shown false. (shrink)

In the Critique of the Power of Judgement, Kant claims that ‘the English taste in gardens or the baroque taste in furniture pushes the freedom of the imagination almost to the point of the grotesque’ (KU 5:242). This paper attempts to reconstruct Kant’s views on the grotesque as a theoretical foundation for the modern conception of the grotesque as a negative aesthetic category. The first section of the paper considers and ultimately rejects the interpretation of the grotesque as a difficult (...) kind of beauty. The second section contrasts the experience of the grotesque with similar experiences of sublimity and dreams. The third section examines the discord between faculties underlying the experience of the grotesque, defining the grotesque as a subclass of ugliness and addressing potential objections to its inclusion in Kant’s aesthetics. The fourth and final section briefly discusses the specificity of the grotesque as a subclass of ugliness. (shrink)

edited by Tuija Takala and Matti Häyry, welcomes contributions on the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of bioethics.

Este trabajo intenta resolver una tensión que existe en el modo en que Aristóteles concibe el apeiron de Anaximandro, la substancia a partir de la cual se genera el cosmos. En algunas partes del corpus, Aristóteles la presenta como un cuerpo básico que genera el cosmos por medio de un cambio de sus cualidades, pero en otras como un cuerpo compuesto de substancias básicas que el cual generaría el cosmos cuando éstas se separan la una de la otra. Como veremos, (...) sin embargo, sólo este segundo modelo es el que Aristóteles realmente le atribuye a Anaximandro. Al final, se propone una hipótesis respecto de quién podría ser entonces la persona, o grupo de personas, que Aristóteles tiene en mente cuando se refiere al primer modelo. (shrink)

Este artigo é uma introdução crítica ao problema da vagueza. Não vou explicar ou avaliar as teorias da vagueza aqui. Meu objetivo é introduzir e discutir o próprio problema, com o intuito de alcançar uma formulação clara do mesmo. Minha formulação tornará claro quais condições uma teoria ideal da vagueza deveria satisfazer, assim como os principais obstáculos para desenvolver teorias que satisfaçam estas condições.

Evans famosamente declarou que Frege não aceitou a possibilidade de sentido sem referente, o que significa que ele não foi tão tolerante com nomes vazios quanto comumente se pensa. Um problema central para a tese de Evans é que Frege diz explicitamente que aceita esta possibilidade, e parece que ele de fato foi tolerante com nomes vazios. Neste artigo, defendo que a solução de Evans para este problema implica que Frege estava comprometido com uma explicação implausível das frases contendo nomes (...) vazios. (shrink)

Half a century later, a Dretskean stance on epistemic closure remains a minority view. Why? Mainly because critics have successfully poked holes in the epistemologies on which closure fails. However, none of the familiar pro-closure moves works against the counterexamples on display here. It is argued that these counterexamples pose the following dilemma: either accept that epistemic closure principles are false, and steal the thunder from those who attack classical logic on the basis of similarly problematic cases—specifically, relevance logicians and (...) like-minded philosophers—or stick with closure and surrender to relevantist claims of failure in truth-preservation aimed at classical rules of inference. Classicist closure advocates find the promise of a way out of the dilemma in the works of Roy Sorensen and John Hawthorne. The paper argues against their pro-closure move and renews Robert Audi’s call for a theory of closure-failure. (shrink)

The present paper studies a family of Stoic proofs of the intelligence of the cosmos, i. e. of the thesis that the cosmos is intelligent in the strong sense that it is, as a whole, something that thinks. This family, ‘F2’, goes back to a proof, ‘XP’, found in Philebus 29a9–30 a8 and Xenophon Mem. 1.4.8. F2 infers the intelligence of the cosmos, as XP does, from the general idea that our intelligence proceeds from the cosmos, which is the ultimate (...) cause of why we are intelligent, and the further claim that, since this is so, the cosmos itself must be intelligent. They differ from one another, however, in how they account for. In this paper, I present a new reason for why the accounts are different, that complements those given by David Sedley in a recent and important study of Stoic cosmology. Based on the analogy between intelligence and the four elements, XP puts forward the idea that the intelligence currently present in us is a portion of cosmic intelligence that has separated from it at some point in the past, and that has travelled from the outside cosmos to us. In contrast, the theory used by F2 to explain the generation of human intelligence is grounded not in the notions of separation and locomotion, but in that of transmission of a state. As I argue in some detail, the separation-locomotion model and the transmission model are not only different from each other, but also logically independent from one another: in general terms, neither entails the other. This transmission model used by the Stoics in a proof of the intelligence of the cosmos, I submit, is a major innovation in ancient cosmological and metaphysical thinking. (shrink)